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2Introductory remarks
Enlargement of the European Union (EU) towards the east is a step toward creating security and
stability beyond the borders of present day “Europe”. The new opportunities at the same time
also carry some new risks and political challenges. These emanate on the one hand from
economically and politically unstable neighbouring states and on the other hand from follow-up
questions beyond the current requirements of EU enlargement towards the east. Ukraine, located
between Russia and Poland, and a case of unfinished transition, includes as well risks and
challenges for the EU. At the same time, Ukraine remains at risk for exclusion from European
institutions. Such an exclusion would preclude the possibility of influencing the Ukrainian
transition through norm setting from the outside and encouraging a western orientation.
The policy recommendations “A European Perspective for Ukraine - Risks and Challenges”
are based on the report “Beyond EU enlargement”.1 The report  deals for the first time with the
potentials and risks at the eastern and south-eastern borders of the European Union that will exist
“beyond enlargement”, with “beyond” understood in a threefold sense:
Geographically as regards those states and border regions for which the EU has not yet
formulated accession prospects, and which will thus find themselves beyond the European
integration process in the medium term as well;
Temporally as regards the follow-up questions of enlargement towards the east from 2005
onwards for various policy areas;
Qualitatively as regards the questions of principle to be derived from enlargement towards the
east and the discernible finality of the Union.
These three dimensions are not only relevant for the analyses of Eastern and Southeastern Europe
presented in the two accompanying volumes, but also for future policies which will be geared
towards all of Europe, along and beyond the borders of the EU. As far as the regions beyond the
future EU borders are concerned, the key questions of exporting stability without importing
instability, of permeability and control, of enlargement process and foreign policy are
                                               
1 Beyond EU Enlargement. Strategy Paper, Werner Weidenfeld (ed.), Gütersloh 2001.
3unavoidable. At the moment these bordering states can bedivided into two groups: The successor
states of the former Soviet Union, which after eastern enlargement will come to share a border
with the EU, and the southeastern region of Europe. Both regions confront European decision
makers with new tasks in the area of security policy, caused by the whole spectrum of
transformation problems, ranging from economic crises to minority conflicts escalating into
violence. In this context, the EU is required like no other organisation in Europe to play a role as
stabiliser in the transformation process, and also as a soft-security provider. In formulating its
policies, the EU has up to now opted for various forms of co-operation that do not offer the
perspective of accession: In its co-operation with Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia
accession has been excluded for the time being. Relations with states that will be in Direct
Neighbourhood with the enlarged EU are limited to partnership and co-operation. For the regions
of acute crisis in the “Western Balkans”, on the other hand, the “window of opportunity” for
prospective accession has been opened, and is supported by the Stability Pact as well as the
Stabilisation and Association Process.
Despite substantial differences, the security and stability problems in both regions can be
approached via a comparison of four key areas:
1. Minority problems and legacies of the past;
2. Questions of visa and customs procedures;
3. Regional and cross-border co-operation;
4. Pan-European security.
With these topics in mind, the regions of the future eastern border (Direct Neighbourhood) and
the future southeastern border were investigated in order to identify risks and follow-up questions
resulting from the process of enlarging the EU towards the east. Conclusions and consequences
can be found in the subsequent policy recommendations. Even though Ukraine is an important
neighbour for the enlarged EU, it should be analysed and considered strategically in a wider
framework.
4Transition problems and challenges for Ukraine
Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has remained a difficult case of transition. Until 1995
successful achievements reforms were mostly limited to foreign policy. The Ukrainian goals for
its position in international relations focus on a balance between Russia and the West. Relations
with the West were consolidated by signing the “Charta NATO-Ukraine”, fulfilling American
requirements of the withdrawal of nuclear warheads, membership in the Council of Europe, co-
operation with the EU and rapprochement with the Central and East European states. Polish-
Ukrainian relations changed from hostility based on legacies of the past to a strategic partnership
in Central Europe. Deepening and strengthening of relations with the EU is one of Ukraine’s
priorities, because of internal as well as external interests. The EU is one of the most important
actors supporting the Ukrainian transition process. The EU’s policy towards the Central and East
European accession states and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe are the best examples
of making closer relations with the Union, up to and including membership, conditional on
economic, social and political reform. Furthermore EU-Ukrainian relations are important to
maintaining Ukraine as an independent nation-state. At the same time, Ukraine has succeeded in
regulating key problems with Russia, as seen by the signing of the treaty on the Black Sea Fleet
as well as an agreement on good neighbourliness and co-operation.
In contrast to the successful foreign policy, internal reforms towards democracy, market economy
and civil society have been very slow. While some formal progress such as the adaptation of a
post-socialist constitution in 1996, the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections in 1994
and 1999 and the introduction of the national currency Hryvna in 1996 has been achieved, the
record of institutional reforms in Ukraine was very weak:
5Table 1. Progress in transition in sectors 19992
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Hungary 28 80 4 4+ 3+ 3+ 4+ 3 4 3+
Czech Republic 27 80 4 4+ 3 3 4+ 3 3+ 3
Estonia 28 75 4 4+ 3 3 4 3- 4- 3
Slovak Republic 26 75 4 4+ 3 3 4+ 2 3+ 3
Poland 26 65 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 3+
Slovenia 25 55 3+ 4+ 3- 3 4+ 2 3+ 3
Latvia 25 65 3 4 3- 3 4+ 3- 3 2+
Lithuania 25 70 3 4+ 3- 3 4 2+ 3 3-
Croatia 24 60 3 4+ 3- 3 4 2 3 2+
Bulgaria 22 60 3 3+ 2+ 3 4+ 2 3- 2
FYR Macedonia 22 55 3 4 2 3 4 1 3 2-
Albania 21 75 2 4 2 3 4 2 2 2-
Romania 21 60 3- 4- 2 3 4 2 3- 2
Moldova 21 45 3 3+ 2 3 4 2 2+ 2
Russia 20 70 3+ 4 2- 3- 2+ 2+ 2- 2-
Ukraine 19 55 2+ 3+ 2 3 3 2 2 2
Belarus 12 20 1 2 1 2- 1 2 1 2
(1=hardly any progress, 4+=standards of industrialized countries)
Responsible for the sustained reform resistance of Ukraine was, apart from the lack of a national
elite and the absence of suitable state institutions, the high level of corruption and the capture of
the state by private interests. The development of a deeply entrenched rent-seeking system has
hindered reforms in general and stifled markets and private enterprise in particular. A very
illustrative indicator is the extremely small flow of foreign direct investment into Ukraine, apart
from Belarus the lowest per capita of all European transition countries.
                                               
2 EBRD, Transition Report 1999 London 2000, p. 24.
6The year 2000, however, was a remarkably successful year in reform terms for Ukraine. The
government of PM Yushchenko was the first government in Ukraine, which was determined to
put structural reforms through, genuinely interested in maximizing welfare for Ukraine. Among
the major achievements the mentioning of the following should be made:
Table. 2.  Reform Successes of the Yushchenko-Government3
· paradigmatic change of government away
from rent-seeking behaviour towards good
governance
· reduction of wage and pension arrears
· substantial reduction of state subsidies for
various sectors and enterprises
· implementation of structural reforms in
agriculture
· strengthening of fiscal discipline and
improvement of budget procedures
· start of structural reforms in the energy
sector
· reduction of non-monetary transfers
(barter)
· speeding-up of privatisation
· reduction of foreign debt · first successes in deregulation of industry
                                               
3 See in particular German Advisory Group on Economic Reforms, The First 365 Days: A Constructive
Retrospective of Economic Reforms in Ukraine in the Year 2000, Kyiv, January 2001.
7Partly as a result of the above-mentioned reforms, macroeconomic data for 2000 is quite
impressive:
Table. 3.  Key Economic Indicators for Ukraine4
1997 1998 1999 2000
Nominal GDP USD bn 50.2 41.9 30.8 32.2
GDP growth (real) % yoy -3.0 -1.9 -0.4 6.0
Industrial production % yoy -1.2 -1.7 2.2 12.9
Agricultural production % yoy -1.9 -9.8 -6.9 7.6
Private consumption % yoy 0.5 2.0 1.5 5.0 *
CPI % yoy aop 15.9 10.6 22.7 28.2
CPI % yoy eop 10.1 20.0 19.2 25.8
PPI % yoy aop 7.7 13.2 31.5 20.9
Exports (gs, USD) % yoy 0.0 -13.4 -7.9 19.6 +
Imports (gs, USD) % yoy 2.0 -14.0 -19.1 15.0 +
Terms of trade % yoy 6.3 1.5 -10.6 2.2
Current account USD bn -1.3 -1.3 0.8 1.9
Current account % GDP -2.7 -3.1 2.7 5.8
FDI (net) USD bn 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6
Gross official reserves, net gold USD bn 2.3 0.6 1.0 1.6
Fiscal balance % GDP -6.6 -1.9 -1.3 0.7
Total public debt % GDP 30.4 51.5 62.8 44.1
External debt (total) % GDP 19.4 38.4 51.0 32.2
Monetary base % yoy eop 44.6 21.9 39.3 39.9
Exchange rate USD aop 1.9 2.4 4.1 5.4
While formal structural changes have progressed, informal structures remain reform resistant.
Apart from the absence of suitable state institutions, the high level of corruption, and the capture
of the state by private interests were responsible for the sustained reform resistance of Ukraine.
The development of a deeply entrenched rent-seeking system has hindered reforms in general and
stifled markets, private enterprise and foreign direct investment in particular. Decision-making is
more dominated by key actors and interest groups than by institutions, differentiation between
                                               
4 Derzhkomstat, NBU, Deutsche Bank Research, European Central Bank, Institute for Economic Research and Policy
Consulting, Kyiv, www.ire.kiev.ua.
8economic and political power remains very low, and the weakness of civil society is a major
obstacle for transition problems. Ukrainian actors and representatives of international
organisations have properly criticised violations of the media, human rights and representatives
of the opposition. At the beginning of 2001 President Kuchma came under national pressure and
international critique because of his alleged involvement in the disappearance of the journalist
Gregory Gongaze. Furthermore, the ousting and arrest of Yulia Timoshenko, the former deputy
Prime minister in charge of the energy sector, was a symptom as well as cause of problems of
corruption and weak civil society. Therefore, despite the positive results of the Ukrainian reform
efforts in 2000, one can foresee a full range of future risks for the transition of Ukraine and,
hence, its relations with Europe. These risks have been aggravated by the recent ousting of the
Yushchenko-government by an anti-reform coalition of communists and oligarchs in April:
(a) Economic Growth: Economic growth in Ukraine is far from sustainable. Major factors in last
year’s 6% growth of GDP were the drastic devaluation of the Ukrainian Hryvna in 1998, the low
statistical base, and the growth of the Russian economy, which is fuelled by soaring oil and gas
prices. As Russian economic growth is already slowing down, Ukrainian growth will be put to
the test in the second half of this year. Growth can only be sustained if Ukraine continues to
follow the paths of reforms.
(b) WTO-Accession: The years 98/99 were completely lost to Ukraine’s efforts to become a
member of WTO. The Yushchenko government resumed the work and made good progress last
year. However, the preparatory measures for WTO accession have come to a halt and there seems
to be a lack of coordination between various government agencies.
(c) Administrative Reforms: Administrative reforms proved to be too slow and are sabotaged
by the old administrative elites. Pathologies of the soviet style bureaucracy still persist. Only an
efficient and well-paid public service will ensure sustainable economic reforms in the long run.
(d) Structural Reforms: After the ousting of Deputy Prime Minister Timoshenko the reform
drive particularly in the energy sector has weakened. Weather the recent privatisation of 6
regional energy companies will bring about a structural change remains to be seen. Furthermore,
the future of privatisation, which was already in the past lacking transparency, seems to be rather
bleak in the wake of a strengthening of communists and oligarchs.
9(e) Public Finances: The budget situation in Ukraine is still precarious. A return to soft-budget
policies and large scale subsidies for various industrial sectors would easily off-set the successes
of Yushchenko in this field. Already in April, there has been a considerably reduction in budget
revenues. Similarly, the problem of sovereign foreign debt looms large. Paris Club negotiations
have been postponed and relations with the IMF are already strained.
(f) Investment Climate: The investment climate in Ukraine has not improved due to the
following impediments:
· Accreditation and Standardization: The lack of progress in the field of accreditation,
standardization and introduction of Euro-norms hampers economic cooperation and
investment. While some new laws are in the pipeline, nothing has changed at the working
level for the better. Ukraine has introduced even less Euro-norms than Belarus.
· Weak protection of private property: Unfortunately, there are still serious deficiencies
concerning the protection of private property in Ukraine, such as the lack of private
ownership of land, the non-existence of a mandatory Central Registry of Pledges of
Movables, the weak protection of intellectual property rights and trade marks, and the
deficiencies concerning corporate governance.
· High level of regulation: Despite some attempts to deregulate, a very high level of state
regulation persists in Ukraine. For building a supermarket in Ukraine one has to obtain
over 150 separate permissions. The whole process, which is largely intransparent, takes
twice as long as in candidate states and is very costly.
· Lack of legal reforms: Crucial cornerstones of legal reform such as the Law on Justice,
the Civil Code, the Civil Procedural Code, the Land Law, and the Administrative Code
are still pending in parliament. Additionally, the weak court system hampers investment:
Judges are often dependent on local authorities. In particular the arbitration courts often
lack the necessary expertise and transparency to deal with the highly complicated civil
law and tax issues.
· Tax Reforms: Current tax legislation in Ukraine is often contradictory and prohibitive.
Its application by state authorities seems even more questionable. Apparently, the work
on a unified modern Tax Code in the Parliament is very slow and will not bring about the
necessary changes to improve the business climate in the near future.
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· Arbitrary inspections of businesses: Inspections by tax, fire protection, sanitary and
veterinary state agencies are very frequent, often have an abusive character and seem
disproportionately targeted at foreign companies. The number of state agencies that have
the power to inspect businesses is still much too high. Their powers, in particular to arrest
property, should radically be reduced and procedures should be streamlined.
· Banking System: The Banking sector is still very weak and contributes very little to
finance investment in the real economy. While in 2000 deposits and credits increased
considerably, at the beginning of this year total volume of credits decreased.
From the point of view of international relations, Ukraine has made remarkable progress.
Rapprochement with Poland and other Central and East European states was achieved. Ukraine’s
foreign policy is well balanced between Russia, Europe and America. The current international
orientation of Ukraine is very much in the Western interest in an independent Ukraine. But the
West is also interested in an internally stable Ukraine. Although Ukraine has succeeded in
making some important reform steps, the transition is still far from stability and sustainability.
From this point of view, Ukraine is a risk for Europe, and particularly for an enlarged European
Union.
Success and shortcomings of European policy towards Ukraine
The European Union has signed Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA) with Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. With the exception of Belarus, the agreements have been ratified
by all countries and taken effect. Drawn up along the same lines, the agreements reflect Western
interest in bilateral political co-operation on democratic foundations, as well as Eastern interest in
economic co-operation. If the possibilities provided for in the agreements are completely
implemented, this will create a broad range of opportunities for political dialogue and economic
co-operation on various levels, from summits to concrete working groups, and in the case of
economic co-operation may even lead to the establishment of free trade zones. The Partnership
and Co-operation Agreements with Ukraine and Russia are supplemented by Common Strategies
for each, instruments of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Between 1991 and 1999
EU member states and the EU were main supporters of the Ukrainian transition process with an
amount of 3.7 billion ECU for technical assistance.
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In formulating its policies of co-operation with Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia, the EU
has up to now opted for various forms of co-operation that do not offer the perspective of
accession.
The country reports of “Beyond EU Enlargement”5 on relations between the Russian Federation,
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and the European Union published in the documentation point
toward distinct deficits and potentials insufficiently explored. One major point of criticism is
raised in the country reports on Ukraine and Moldova. By way of a strategic answer, Ukraine and
Moldova passed policy statements of their own on their relations to the EU. These are aimed at
early association and the inherent promise of prospective membership. This has to be seen in
conjunction with the foreign policy aims of distancing themselves from the hegemony of Russia
and strengthening national sovereignty.
While Kiev and Chisinau think of prospective membership as a factor stabilising the
transformation process, Brussels regards the fact that the transformation tasks have only been
very insufficiently fulfilled as one of the main obstacles to formulating membership prospects.
While the East European side perceives the continuing lack of membership prospects as a risk
leading to loss of stability throughout Europe, the West European side fears that even a debate
about possible accession might endanger internal security and stability in Western Europe.
The imbalance between the Ukrainian position on the one side and the EU position on the other
leads to a strategic vacuum. In view of the dilemma created by the lack of EU membership
prospects and unsolved transformation problems, there is a danger that Ukraine will remain a
politically and economically “risky neighbour”. Should Poland be among the first East Central
European members of the EU, the asymmetries along this border will continue to grow. It has to
be assumed that the security and stability problems will increase too.
Complete or partial failure of the Ukrainian transformation would at the same time influence
relations with the Russian Federation. Ukraine is still ethnically and economically a weakly
consolidated nation-state. Because of its economic structure and ethnic make-up, Ukraine has
traditionally been divided into a Russian-dominated east and a genuinely Ukrainian west. Russian
dominance over the so-called “near abroad” also becomes manifest in economic dependencies, in
                                               
5 Beyond EU Enlargement, Volume 1: The Agenda of Direct Neighbourhood for Eastern Europe, Iris Kempe
(ed.), Volume 2: The Agenda of Stabilisation for Southeastern Europe, Wim van Meurs (ed.), Gütersloh 2001.
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particular the almost complete dependence on Russian energy supplies. Not only are the
enormous debts owed to Russia for energy supplies a sensitive factor, but so are the routes of the
pipelines. In the discussion about leading the Yamal pipeline through Belarus, Russia is making a
point of bypassing Ukraine. This is not only perceived as violating Kiev’s interests, but also
raises Polish sensitivities. Ukraine’s national independence and economic strength are of strategic
concern to Poland. Through consolidation in the core of Europe, the Polish government is trying
to make the Russian influence more calculable. In case of Poland’s EU accession, the conflict
about energy between Russia and Ukraine would also put a burden on EU-Russian relations,
especially as Russia’s political and economic interests overlap considerably in the gas and oil
sector.
Recommendations for strategies
Ukraine clearly demonstrates the agenda of polices beyond EU enlargement. With its
enlargement towards the east, the EU contributes to ensuring stability and preventing conflicts in
today’s Europe. Despite the historic importance of this process, European politics has by no
means reached its final point. On the contrary, enlargement towards the east entails new risks, but
also new chances. Continuing instabilities in the neighbourhoods of the EU – the Direct
Neighbourhood of Ukraine, but also of the other CIS countries, Russia, Belarus and Moldova for
whom the Union has not formulated accession prospects so far, and the trouble spot southeastern
Europe with promises of EU prospects – challenge the Union in its capacity for setting norms.
1. The European Union is increasingly taking over responsibility for security and stability in
a far-ranging concept of Europe which not only comprises the accession states but also
regions beyond the future external borders of the EU, whose instability has or may have
repercussion on Europe. As a consequence, however, the other “mega-projects” of the EU,
like enlargement towards the east, can no longer be dealt with in a purely normative way
along the conditionality of the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis communautaire. The
enlargement reached a step where it is becoming politically. The process has be seen in the
broader context of regional stabilisation and geopolitics – as was recognised in Helsinki
where the accession negotiations with Romania and Bulgaria were “brought forward”. The
contradiction between quality and speed of enlargement towards the east is of a structural
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nature. However, as a consequence it is not only the transformation efforts that are
rewarded, but also, in the worst case, transformation failure and regional instability.
2. One strategic deficit of the policy of the European Commission vis-à-vis the CIS is its
limited differentiation. Decisions must not be made along the lines of system
transformation, but in addition also have to take the European self-determination of the
states into account. The basic No to CIS states willing to become members entails the risk
of increasing instability caused by the rejection. At the same time the norm-setting policy of
the EU loses its attractiveness and influence, as movement towards Europe or overcoming
the problems of transformation respectively no longer carry the promise of positive
sanction. In order to eliminate the strategic deficit the basic No to EU accession of Ukraine
and Moldova, the European Commission should formulate EU prospects for Ukraine and
Moldova. The implications of this reversal of policy will, however, be limited to rhetoric
until the states willing to accede can prove that they have made real progress in their
transformation processes. This makes it even more important for the EU to emphasise the
conditionality of the Copenhagen Criteria in its dialogue with the states concerned. In the
TACIS projects to support the transformation process it is also important to point towards
the acquis communautaire of the European Union in the sense of a normative aim. This new
EU-policy would also meet the necessity for a long-term perspective, which was somehow
missing in the past. In the long run, the EU should bet on the long-term success of the
Ukrainian transition. This process will lead despite temporary set-backs clearly towards
Europe and is best supported by the raising of interdependence between the EU and
Ukraine. In this respect, the EU should be very careful not to repeat the mistakes as
committed in the Belarussian case. Only interdependence and integration leads to sustained
structural change.
3. First and foremost any kind of perspective of EU membership for Ukraine and other CIS
states depends on two factors: their interest in being an EU state as well as the development
of the transition process. While Ukraine explicitly formulated its wish to become an EU
associated country, the internal transition is far from achieving Union standards. Therefore,
Ukraine has to develop a realistic policy for EU integration based on technical issues of
convergence rather then political lip-service. Hence, the key of this policy must be the
completion of political, legal and economic reforms. As shown above, the reform process of
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Ukraine is far from being smooth and bears various risks. To make the reform process
successful and sustainable it will take a unified effort by the Ukrainian government and its
people. The EU and its Member States can help to make Ukraine’s ride to Europe less
bumpy by setting benchmarks and encouraging their fulfilment via political support and
technical assistance. The main responsibility and key to success, however, is to be found in
Ukraine itself.
4. As long as Belarus is dominated by the Lukashenko regime, it will remain a risky
neighbour. It is in the European interest to contribute to securing stability through a
democratisation of Belarus. The Serbian case has demonstrated the effectiveness of
supporting regional players and advocates of economic reform to bring about domestic
change in Belarus and in this way to tighten the country’s links to Europe. Apart from
numerous possibilities of co-operation it is first of all necessary to increase the presence of
European institutions in Minsk.
5. In view of the attractiveness of EU membership and the heterogeneity of the neighbouring
states (e.g. “Western Balkans”) co-operation among neighbouring states will realistically
come second behind a conditional, bilateral convergence with and integration into the
European Union. Regional co-operation should accordingly be supported as a supplement to
rather than as an alternative to EU integration.
6. By the same token it is necessary to synchronise EU integration and multilateral regional
co-operation in sub-regions, which could eventually stretch across the external border.
Organisations for interstate regional co-operation offer a constructive forum for dialogue
and co-operation throughout Europe, especially where their aims, or rather their
membership, reaches across present and/or future EU borders: Northern Dimension, Black
Sea Co-operation, Baltic Sea Council and OSCE. On the other hand they serve as an
important counterbalance for centripetal tendencies in Europe and turn peripheral border
regions into European sub-regions.
7. Especially in the area of cross-border co-operation, it is imperative to subordinate the
institutional-procedural framework to the functionality of the respective funding
programme. Accordingly an adjustment or rather a merger of the EU programmes for cross-
border co-operation – Interreg-CBC for EU members, PHARE for accession countries,
TACIS for CIS states, CARDS for the “Western Balkans” – would be appropriate for the
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state of the European integration and enlargement. As a model for interregional and cross-
border co-operation, the EU initiative Northern Dimension should be translated into the
form of an East Central European Dimension to relations between Poland and Ukraine.
8. Prioritising cross-border co-operation also requires a reconciliation with the requirements
set for accession candidates by the Schengen criteria. While in view of the visa
requirements the erection of new dividing lines and thus an increase in the asymmetries
along these borders is unavoidable, the negative consequences, especially for the border
regions, can be limited with the corresponding preparation and commitment. An effective
visa strategy must consist of a dovetailed approach combining an optimum of technical-
administrative procedures with measures of cross-border co-operation.
Overall it is part of the open self-definition of the EU not to pursue a foreign policy in the
classical sense vis-à-vis its neighbours, but to offer conditional accession prospects. Up to now
the inner prosperity and stability of the EU as well as the attractiveness of this accession offer
have proved to be highly effective instruments in relations with the neighbouring transformation
countries.
The debate about limits to enlargement should, however, give more consideration to the time
dimension and the capacity of the EU to integrate new members. A Union which would, e.g.
offer accession prospects to Ukraine – with the corresponding expectation management and time
tables – can contribute more to a long-term reduction of national instability and transformation
deficits of this neighbour. At the same time, guaranteeing the quality and the capacity of the
union to integrate new members requires a more concrete concept for enlargement towards the
east. Realistic expectations management as well as the best-possible arrangements for follow-up
issues in connection with the future neighbours, require an early setting of the date and the names
for a first round of enlargement. If the EU were to come to a decision soon, this would on the one
hand curb unrealistic expectations on the side of the candidate countries and on the other hand
leave enough preparation time to cushion the consequences of a temporary concrete exclusion for
accession countries and third countries beyond the union. Typically, this will lead to a
differentiated political and economic integration, in order to counterbalance destabilising
asymmetries along the external border.
